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This paper presents the first national estimates of the effects of the SCHIP expansions on
insurance coverage. Using CPS data on insurance coverage during the years 1996 through 2000, we
estimate two-stage least squares regressions of insurance coverage. We find that SCHIP had a small,
but statistically significant positive effect on insurance coverage. Our regression results imply that
between 4% and 10% of children meeting income eligibility standards for the new program gained
public insurance. While low, these estimates indicate that states were more successful in enrolling
children in SCHIP than they were with prior Medicaid expansions focused on children just above
the poverty line. Crowd-out of private health insurance was estimated to be in line with estimates
for the Medicaid expansions of the early 1990s, between 18% and 50%.
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Introduction 
 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was signed into law as part of 
Title XXI of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act.  The goal of the legislation was to increase the 
insurance coverage of children in the United States by extending eligibility for public insurance 
to children in families earning too much to qualify for Medicaid yet too little to afford private 
health insurance.  Touted as the largest expansion in health insurance since the enactment of 
Medicaid in 1965, the SCHIP legislation apportioned more than $40 billion in federal matching 
funds over ten years beginning in fiscal year 1998.  States are allowed to use these funds to 
expand Medicaid eligibility, develop new insurance programs, and to increase outreach for 
children already eligible for public coverage.     
The efficacy and cost of public insurance expansions depend critically on two factors: 
program take-up and the possible substitution of public coverage for private coverage—i.e., 
“crowd-out”.  A number of recent studies find low take-up rates for individuals who became 
eligible for public insurance through the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and Kenney 1997; Shore-Sheppard 1997; Yazici and Kaestner 
2000; Blumberg et al. 2000; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2001; Card and Shore-Sheppard 2001).
1  
Previous studies also suggest that the Medicaid expansions contributed to a decline in private 
insurance, though the estimated magnitude of this effect varied considerably.   
Low take-up might be an even greater problem for SCHIP as many of the families made 
eligible for the program had little prior experience with public insurance programs, and therefore 
may lack good information about the program.  Negative perceptions of the quality of public 
                                                 
1Low take-up is not unique to health insurance, but is a problem with most public programs.  See Remler et 
al. (2001) for a recent review. 
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health insurance and stigma related to public assistance also represent potentially serious barriers 
to enrollment.  Evidence from the Medicaid expansions suggests that take-up falls as coverage is 
extended to relatively higher income families.  For example, Currie and Gruber (1996) find that 
take-up was higher among women who gained eligibility from expansions that were targeted at 
families in poverty than for those who gained coverage from broader expansions.  Similarly, 
Card and Shore-Sheppard (2001) find that expansions targeting children under the federal 
poverty line (FPL) led to a 10 to 15% increase in Medicaid coverage, whereas legislation 
extending eligibility to children with incomes up to 133% of the FPL had essentially no effect.   
Since private insurance coverage increases with income, crowd-out is potentially a 
greater problem for SCHIP than for prior expansions of public insurance.  However, in response 
to research showing large crowd-out effects for Medicaid, SCHIP programs were designed with 
explicit mechanisms intended to keep newly eligible families from dropping private coverage in 
favor of public insurance.  Thus, whether crowd-out is more or less of a problem in the case of 
SCHIP as compared to the earlier Medicaid expansions is an empirical question.
2  
Because the program is relatively new, research on the effects of SCHIP is quite limited.  
Two recent studies present evidence on trends in insurance coverage for children in the early 
years of SCHIP implementation (Zuckerman et al. 2001; Rosenbach et al. 2001).  They show that 
the percent insured fell slightly for children in families with incomes above 200% of FPL, while 
remaining relatively constant for lower income children who were more likely to be affected by 
SCHIP.  Since coverage had been previously falling for children in the SCHIP target population 
                                                 
2 The anti-crowd-out provisions of SCHIP may seem to render this question moot.  However, research on 
legislation designed to prevent the substitution of Medicare for private insurance by workers over the age of 65 
suggests that those rules were largely ineffective (Glied and Stabile 2001).  Even if SCHIP were implemented in a 
way to limit direct transitions from private to public insurance, crowd-out can still occur if the program inhibits 
transitions from uninsurance or public insurance to private coverage.   
   4 
(incomes between 100 and 200% of the FPL) this suggests a positive, if small, effect of the 
program.  Neither study attempts to calculate rates of take-up or crowd-out.  Kronick and Gilmer 
(2001) study the effect of four state-level programs implemented prior to SCHIP on the 
insurance coverage of adults.  They estimate that these programs were successful in enrolling 
between 6 and 24% of the target population.  Estimates of crowd-out vary across states and, 
interestingly, are larger for two states (Minnesota and Tennessee) whose programs included 
greater explicit protections against crowd-out.  As expected, Kronick and Gilmer find greater 
evidence of crowd-out for adults with incomes above the FPL as compared to those below.   
Our study is the first to estimate the effect of SCHIP eligibility on public and private 
insurance coverage of children.  We use 1997-2001 data from Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and econometric techniques similar to those used in previous research on the Medicaid 
expansions (e.g., Currie and Gruber 1996; Cutler and Gruber 1996; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 
2001).  Specifically, we use an instrumental variables approach that relies on variation in the 
timing and extent of coverage expansions to identify the effect of SCHIP on insurance coverage.  
In addition to estimating the overall effect of SCHIP eligibility on coverage by public insurance 
(take-up), private insurance (crowd-out), and uninsurance, we test for differences between states 
that implemented SCHIP by expanding Medicaid eligibility and those that established new stand-
alone programs.   
We find that the enactment of SCHIP led to a small, but statistically significant reduction 
in the rate of uninsurance for children.  The program take-up rate implied by our results is lower 
than comparable estimates for the Medicaid expansions of the 1980s and 1990s as a whole, 
though larger than estimates pertaining to Medicaid expansions that, like SCHIP, were targeted 
at children above the poverty line.  We find no statistically significant difference across types of   5 
SCHIP programs.  Estimation of take-up and crowd-out effects in our data are complicated by 
the fact that some public health insurance plans, particularly newly created non-Medicaid 
programs, could be mistaken by CPS respondents for private health insurance plans.  Indeed, our 
results provide evidence that is suggestive of such errors in reporting.  Treating the CPS 
insurance data as accurate results in small and statistically insignificant estimates of crowd-out.  
In contrast, models that account for potential misreporting suggest that crowd-out represents 
between one-fifth and one-half of the increase in public coverage.   
 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program  
Like Medicaid, SCHIP is a joint federal-state program, though SCHIP offers states more 
flexibility with respect to eligibility criteria, program design, and benefits.  States had three 
broad options for implementing SCHIP.  They could expand their Medicaid programs by either 
increasing income eligibility thresholds or extending coverage to age groups that were not 
eligible for Medicaid previously, create a new separate health insurance program for children, or 
do both.  At the time of implementation, a key argument for expanding Medicaid was that states 
could build on existing infrastructure for administration, enrollment, and process of claims.  The 
main disadvantages of this approach were that it required conforming to existing federal rules 
that some states consider burdensome as well as the effect of any negative reputation associated 
with Medicaid (Hill 2000).  The main argument for creating a new insurance program for 
children was that doing so would allow greater flexibility to design a program that better meets 
the needs of children in a particular state.  However, a separate program must contend with 
potentially high costs associated with start-up and outreach.     6 
Table 1 summarizes how the implementation of SCHIP and the program’s effect on 
public insurance eligibility varied across states.  As of March 2001, 19 states expanded 
Medicaid, 15 states created a separate SCHIP program, and 17 states implemented a combination 
program.  There was variation across states in both the extent and timing of the increases in 
eligibility.  In addition, it is clear from Table 1 that states differed in their initial pre-SCHIP 
eligibility criteria and that within states eligibility rules were more generous for younger 
children.  Prior to SCHIP, states were required to cover children 6 years of age and under up to 
133% of poverty and were allowed to expand coverage up to 185% and still receive federal 
matching dollars.  As of 1996 several states had used their own funds to expand eligibility 
beyond 185% of the FPL.  Most states implemented their Title XXI SCHIP expansion programs 
in 1998.  States that implemented both Medicaid expansions and a separate SCHIP program were 
able to start each component at different times, usually expanding Medicaid eligibility first.  
Since eligibility increases were larger in states that previously had lower eligibility limits for 
Medicaid, the SCHIP expansions have reduced the cross-state variation in public insurance 
eligibility standards (Ullman and Hill 2001; Cunningham 2001).   However, it is clear from 
Table 1 that cross-state variation still exists, but within-state variation in eligibility across age 
groups has been largely eliminated.   
Title XXI specifically states that any already-insured children, including those insured 
under Medicaid, are not eligible to enroll in SCHIP.  In order to prevent states from shifting 
enrollees from Medicaid to SCHIP to take advantage of more generous Federal matching rates, 
the legislation requires that children who apply for SCHIP be screened for Medicaid eligibility, 
and those found to eligible can only enroll in Medicaid instead.  Because of this rule, it is 
possible that SCHIP “marketing” may have indirectly increased the Medicaid enrollment of   7 
children who were already eligible for but not covered by that program (U.S. GAO 2000).  
Because nearly 60% of children made eligible by the SCHIP expansions already had private 
health insurance, there was great concern about the potential substitution of public for private 
coverage.  Strategies taken by states to reduce crowd-out include requirements that children must 
be without insurance for some period (typically three to twelve months) prior to enrolling, the 
use of sliding-scale premium contributions for families with incomes above 150% of the FPL 
and subsidies to encourage parents to take-up employer-based coverage when it is available. 
 
Data and Descriptive Evidence 
Our analysis is based on data from the March CPS for the years 1997 through 2001.  The 
March CPS is the most commonly used source of data on the insurance coverage of American 
families.  The advantages of the CPS data for our analysis include large sample sizes afforded 
and the fact that there is information on insurance coverage for every year during, prior to and 
subsequent to the enactment of SCHIP.  In addition, the March CPS includes identifiers for all 
states and data on family income, which are necessary for imputing eligibility for public health 
insurance, as well as family demographic variables.   
All our data are from years after 1995, when the CPS survey was redesigned to improve 
the quality of the health insurance data (Swartz 1997).  However, even after this redesign, some 
problems with the insurance variables are likely to remain.  While the questions refer to coverage 
during the prior calendar year, a number of analysts have concluded that many responses in fact 
reflect coverage at the time of the interview (Swartz 1986; Berger et al. 1998).  Nonetheless, we   8 
treat the insurance variables as pertaining to the prior year.
3  In addition, some research has 
shown that the CPS undercounts the number of people enrolled in Medicaid (Lewis, et al. 1998).   
A measurement issue that is not specific to the CPS arises from the fact that the 
implementation of SCHIP and the growth of Medicaid managed care have blurred the distinction 
between public and private health insurance.  Many state Medicaid programs contract with 
commercial health plans and it is increasingly common for insurance entities that serve only 
publicly insured individuals to be designed to resemble a private health plan.  In addition, as 
noted, some states require some enrollees to pay premiums.  Because of these design features 
many CPS respondents who are enrolled in SCHIP or Medicaid programs may legitimately 
consider themselves to have private insurance.  The greater the extent of such misclassifications, 
the lower will be our estimates of both take-up and crowd-out.  In an attempt to mitigate this 
problem, we explore two alternate dependent variables in our regressions: coverage by 
employer-sponsored (group) private insurance, which should be more easily distinguished from 
SCHIP programs that “look like” private plans, and private non-group insurance coverage, which 
could potentially be mistaken for some states’ SCHIP expansions.
4   
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the five years of CPS data.  The first three rows 
report the percentage of children determined to be eligible for public insurance (Medicaid or 
stand-alone SCHIP programs) according to the eligibility standards and their family income 
                                                 
3 Starting with the 2000 March CPS, a verification question was asked of people who did not acknowledge 
having any insurance coverage throughout the previous year.  The verification question resulted in 8% of apparently 
uninsured respondents reported that they in fact had some coverage (Nelson and Mills 2001).  By including year 
dummies in our regression model we will be able to control for the effect of this change.  
 
4 Since March, 2000 the CPS survey questions concerning public insurance use the names of state-specific 
programs rather than generic terms like Medicaid or SCHIP.  While this should improve the accuracy of responses, 
substantial ambiguity is likely to remain.  Take the example of California.  The CPS survey asks about enrollment in 
Medi-Cal (as the state’s Medicaid program is called) and Healthy Families (California’s SCHIP program).  
However, since both programs contract with a number of private health plans, parents could legitimately consider 
their children to be enrolled in a private plan.       9 
(adjusted by state appropriate income disregard rules) as reported in the CPS.  The fact that 
roughly one-fifth of the children with public insurance are recorded as ineligible for such 
coverage indicates that there is some measurement error in our eligibility determination method.  
The measurement problem is likely to be caused by the fact that eligibility is determined based 
on monthly income while the CPS reports annual income.  Thus, a family whose annual income 
makes them appear ineligible could have experienced a period of eligibility during the year.
5  As 
expected, eligibility for public coverage is lowest for children with private coverage.  However, 
the fact that the percentage of this group who meet the income eligibility standards for Medicaid 
or SCHIP is fairly high—21%—underscores the fact that the potential for crowd-out is a 
significant concern.   
Several other differences across insurance categories are apparent.  Relative to the 
uninsured and publicly insured, children with private coverage are much more likely to be in 
two-parent families, to be white, to have fewer persons in the household in fair or poor health, 
and to be born in the United States.  In terms of labor market variables, private coverage is 
positively associated with the number of adult workers in the household and having at least one 
adult who works for a large firm.  The latter variable is important given the strong relationship 
between firm size and employer provision of health benefits.   
Figures 1 through 4 summarize key time trends in insurance coverage and eligibility.  
Figure 1 shows that, nationally, the percentage of children eligible for public insurance increased 
by 12 percentage points between 1996 and 2000, from 30% to 42%.  The percent without 
insurance fell from 15.1% to 12% over this period.  Since public coverage decreased slightly 
over the period (from 21.3% to 19.9%), these data would suggest that the decline in the 
                                                 
5 Our estimate corresponds to the estimate reported by Cutler and Gruber (1996) indicating that 21% of the 
children made eligible by the Medicaid expansions were already publicly insured prior to the expansions.    10  
uninsurance rate was caused mainly by the increase in private coverage (from 66.4% to 70.6%), 
caused perhaps by the strong economy.  
However, these aggregate figures mask important differences in trends across income 
levels.  Figure 2 reports data for children in families with incomes below the FPL.  In 1996, over 
90% were eligible for Medicaid, and by 2000 virtually 100% were eligible.  Medicaid coverage 
for this group actually fell between 1996 and 1998, before leveling off.  The decline likely 
reflects the effect of welfare reform, which was implemented over this period.  After 1998, 
insurance coverage increased for poor children.  Since essentially all poor children were already 
eligible for Medicaid over this period, this trend cannot be considered a direct effect of expanded 
eligibility for public insurance.  Public coverage could have increased due to a “spillover” effect 
of SCHIP enrollment efforts, though such an explanation is not obvious from the figure, as the 
decline in uninsurance coincides with an increase in private coverage. 
Children in families with incomes between 100 and 200% of the FPL were much more 
likely to be directly impacted by SCHIP.  As shown in Figure 3, public eligibility for this group 
increased nearly fourfold from nearly 22% to slightly over 82%.  Public insurance coverage also 
increased, but by a much smaller amount: 7 percentage points, from 19% to about 26%.  The rate 
of uninsurance in this group fell from 22% to 16%, while private coverage fell by one percentage 
point.  This suggests that SCHIP was associated with an increase in public coverage with a small 
degree of crowd-out.     
Figure 4 presents the corresponding trends for children in families earning between 200 
and 400% of FPL, a group that was not the primary target of the SCHIP expansions and was not 
directly affected in most states.  Public insurance eligibility and enrollment was quite low 
throughout this period, each reaching a high of roughly 8% by 2000.   Private coverage fell by   11  
roughly the same amount that public coverage increased (2%), leaving the percent uninsured 
virtually constant during the period at nearly 9%.  These trends suggest that the limited growth in 
public enrollment due to SCHIP came from the ranks of the privately insured. 
Of course, even when stratifying by income, it is difficult to draw precise inferences from 
such aggregate figures, as they obscure large differences across states and do not control for 
other factors that may have influenced insurance coverage over this period.  Because there was 
significant variation across states in the timing of SCHIP implementation and the extent to which 
changes in income eligibility limits varied both across and within states, it is possible to identify 
the effects of SCHIP on public and private coverage in the context of a multivariate regression 
model that allows for long-run differences across states and national trends.  The next section 
describes our model. 
 
Econometric Specification 
We use the repeated cross-section data from the CPS to estimate several versions of the 
following regression model:     
 
COVERAGEci = αc PUBELIGi + βcXi + γcSTATEi + θcTIMEi + εci,    (1) 
 
where the dependent variable COVERAGEci represents the type of health insurance under which 
the child is covered (c = public, private, or uninsured).  The regressor of primary interest is 
PUBELIG, an indicator for public insurance eligibility, which is imputed using the child’s age, 
family income and the eligibility standards effective in the child’s state of residence at that time.  
The vector X contains demographic variables, including the child’s gender, race, age, the number   12  
of people in the family, the number of workers in the household, and the characteristics of the 
household head.  We include a full set of year and state dummies to account for national trends 
in health insurance coverage and long-standing differences across states, such as state health 
insurance regulations and state policies subsidizing healthcare for the uninsured, for example.   
  As noted, the period of our analysis follows the enactment of Federal welfare reform.  
Like previous legislation concerning Medicaid, the welfare reform bill included provisions to de-
link public health insurance and cash assistance.  While the correlation between eligibility for the 
two programs has in fact declined over the past several decades, it remains quite strong and the 
decline in caseloads caused by welfare reform has contributed to a fall in Medicaid enrollment 
(Ku and Garrett 2000; Kronebusch 2001; Currie and Grogger 2002).  A concern for our analysis 
is that our estimates of the effect of SCHIP will be confounded by the impact of the concurrent 
changes in welfare caseloads.  The inclusion of year dummies in our model will capture the 
national average trend in caseloads.  To account for additional state-year variation we also 
include in our model the AFDC/TANF participation rate (i.e., number of beneficiaries divided by 
population) in each state in each year. 
The two quantities in which we are interested are the marginal take-up rate and the 
crowd-out effect.  The marginal take-up rate is the percent of children who gain eligibility from 
the SCHIP expansions, and is given by the public eligibility coefficient in a regression with 
public insurance coverage as the dependent variable (αPUB).  Crowd-out is commonly defined as 
the decline in private insurance that can be attributed to the public program relative to the 
increase in public coverage.  That is: 
 
Crowd-Out1 = ∆Private/∆Public = αPRIV/αPUB,   13  
 
where the numerator on the right-hand side is the coefficient on PUBELIG from the private 
insurance regression and the denominator is the corresponding coefficient from the public 
insurance regression.  Since the change in private coverage, public coverage and uninsurance 
must sum to zero, the degree of crowd-out can also be expressed as  
 
 Crowd-Out2 = 1 – ∆Uninsured/∆Public = 1 – αUNIN/αPUB,  
 
where the numerator of the second term comes from the regression in which the uninsured 
dummy is the dependent variable.  The two crowd-out measures would be equal given the 
identical right-hand side variables if the insurance categories were mutually exclusive.  However, 
because respondents can report both private insurance and public coverage at some point during 
the year the crowd-out measures will differ.   
  The specification in equation (1) assumes that the effect of expanding eligibility for 
public coverage on a given insurance outcome is the same for states that chose to expand 
Medicaid as for those that established new stand-alone programs.  Given the considerable debate 
concerning the relative merits of these different approaches, it is important to test for differences 
between them.  This can be done by replacing PUBELIG with two variables, one that represents 
eligibility for Medicaid and one pertaining to eligibility for new stand-alone programs: 
 
COVERAGEci = αc1MELIGi   +αc2SELIGi   + βcXi + γcSTATEi + γcTIMEi + vci. (2) 
   14  
With this specification, we can then test whether expanding traditional Medicaid or creating a 
new stand-alone program was more effective in reducing uninsurance and increasing coverage.  
The Medicaid eligibility measure (MELIG) varies from the baseline (1996) period because more 
than half of states expanded Medicaid eligibility either with or without a separate program to 
insure children.  Prior legislation also contributes to changes in Medicaid eligibility over this 
period.  For example, between 1997 and 2000 a certain number of teenagers gained eligibility as 
a result of OBRA 1990, which required states to cover all poor children up to the FPL born after 
September 1983.  The stand-alone program eligibility measure (SELIG) is zero for all 
observations prior to the implementation of states’ new insurance programs.
6   
A problem with ordinary least squares estimation of these models is that public eligibility  
is likely to be endogenous because unobserved factors that are correlated with eligibility are 
likely to affect the demand for and availability of health insurance.  One source of bias is 
unmeasured local economic conditions that lead to both higher rates of public eligibility (through 
an effect on income) and lower rates of private insurance coverage.  This will lead to a spurious 
negative correlation between public insurance eligibility and private insurance coverage.  It is 
also possible that poor health, or having a child who is in poor health, decreases labor supply and 
income and increases the demand for public insurance.  In addition, as mentioned earlier, our 
eligibility variables are measured with error because income is measured imperfectly.  
Regressions that do not correct for endogeneity and measurement error will yield biased 
estimates of α, the coefficient for public eligibility.   
                                                 
 
6 Note that this approach does not rely on the ability to distinguish enrollees of Medicaid versus new 
separate programs, which is difficult in survey data (Dubay and Kenney 2000).  Instead we attempt to decompose 
the respective effects of Medicaid versus new separate program eligibility on insurance coverage.   
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To address this problem, we adopt the instrumental variables strategy used in several 
previous studies to estimate the effects of earlier Medicaid expansions (Currie and Gruber 1996; 
Cutler and Gruber 1996; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2001).  This approach instruments for public 
eligibility using a “simulated eligibility” measure, which represents the percentage of a 
nationally representative sample of children that would be eligible for public insurance in each 
state in each year.  Specifically, we draw a random national sample of 300 children of each age 
from 0 through 18 and for each member of the random sample impute eligibility in each state-
year combination.  We define our simulated eligibility measure as the mean imputed eligibility 
for each state-year-age combination.  This variable represents a valid instrument because its 
variation is driven entirely by differences across states and years in eligibility rules.  Since we 
condition on year and state fixed effects, our models are identified by variation in the extent and 
timing of SCHIP-related eligibility expansions.
7  
It is clear from Figures 1 through 4 that the SCHIP expansions had a strong impact on the 
public insurance eligibility of children in families with incomes between 100% and 200% of the 
FPL (hereafter, the target group) and relatively little effect on the eligibility of poorer children, 
who were for the most part already eligible for Medicaid, or higher income children, the vast 
majority of whom are still not eligible for public coverage.  When equations (1) and (2) are 
estimated using a sample of all children, these lower and higher income children essentially 
serve as control groups for those in the target group.  However, to the extent that the experience 
of children outside the target group do not represent good a counterfactual for children whose 
                                                 
7 As noted above, one difference between SCHIP and Medicaid is that in order to limit crowd-out, states 
use prior insurance status as a factor in determining SCHIP eligibility.  It is not possible to incorporate these 
provisions in our empirical eligibility algorithm.  Thus, the children we classify as being eligible for SCHIP are 
those meeting income-related standards.  Below we present rough estimates of the take-up rate measured relative to 
the number of uninsured children meeting the income standards.     
   16  
eligibility status changed as a result of SCHIP, this identification strategy is flawed.  For 
example, even controlling for cash welfare participation rates, welfare reform may be a 
confounding factor for analyses that include children below the poverty line.  Similarly, it may 
be inappropriate to assume that in the absence of SCHIP the secular trends for children in the 
target group would be the same as for children with much higher incomes.   
To mitigate this potential problem, in addition to estimating equations (1) and (2) using a 
full sample of children, we also estimate models using data for children with family incomes in 
the 100% to 200% of FPL range.  In both cases, the variation in our eligibility variables is 
coming mainly from children in the target group.  However, when we limit the estimation sample 
to this group we do not restrict the effect of state and year effects (or the effects of any other 
variables) to be the same across the entire income distribution.   
 
Regression Results 
Linear probability model results for the full sample are displayed in Table 3.  The panels 
correspond to three different dependent variables: indicator variables for no insurance, public 
insurance and private insurance.  We present results for models using a single measure of public 
insurance eligibility (column 1, which corresponds to equation 1) and ones that allow the effect 
of eligibility for Medicaid and stand-alone SCHIP programs to differ (column 2, corresponding 
to equation 2).  For the sake of brevity we do not report the coefficients on the control variables, 
which conform to the results of previous studies.  In addition, although not reported, in the first 
stage regressions the effects of the simulated eligibility variable(s) on PUBELIG (or MELIG and 
SELIG) were highly significant with coefficients ranging from .86 to .88.     17  
The coefficient for public eligibility indicates that the eligibility expansions of the late 
1990s were associated with a small, but statistically significant reduction in the probability of 
children being uninsured (first row, first panel).  The magnitude of the coefficient estimate 
implies that gaining eligibility for public insurance reduced a child’s probability of being 
uninsured by 7.5 percentage points.  When the dependent variable is public insurance coverage 
(second panel) the coefficient on PUBELIG has the opposite sign and roughly the same 
magnitude, implying that eligibility raises the probability of public coverage by 8.1 percentage 
points.  The results in column 2 suggest there was little difference between Medicaid expansions 
and new insurance programs in terms of the effect on insurance coverage.  When the outcome is 
uninsurance the coefficient for new programs is slightly larger in magnitude than the coefficient 
for expanded Medicaid programs (–0.079 vs. –0.068), while in the public insurance coverage 
regressions the opposite is true (0.067 vs. 0.083).  In both cases, however, the coefficients on 
MELIG and SELIG are not significantly different from each other.  When the dependent variable 
is private insurance coverage (third panel) the effect of public eligibility, either pooled or 
separated into Medicaid and SCHIP, is effectively zero.   
  Table 4 reports the IV results for children in the SCHIP target group, those with incomes 
between 100% and 200% of FPL.  The results are broadly similar to those for the full sample, 
though there are a few differences worth noting.  As in the full sample, the coefficients on 
PUBELIG in the uninsurance and public insurance regressions are opposite in sign but are nearly 
identical in magnitude and significance.  However, the estimated coefficients in the target group 
regressions are less than half as large in magnitude as the corresponding coefficients for the full 
sample: –0.035 and 0.035 compared to –0.074 and 0.081.  Compared to the full sample, the 
results for the target group are more suggestive of differences between the effect of Medicaid   18  
expansions and new stand-alone programs.  In particular, the effect of expansions on the 
uninsurance rate suggests that the effect operated primarily through stand-alone programs.  
However, the effect of Medicaid expansions and new stand-alone programs did not have 
statistically different impacts on public insurance take-up.  The finding that is most similar 
across the two samples that eligibility for public insurance, whether measured with a single 
variable or separate variables for each type of program, does not have a significant effect on 
private insurance coverage.
8   
Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 would suggest that the new public 
enrollment came entirely from the ranks of the uninsured—i.e., there was no crowd-out.  
However, as noted, there is reason to suspect that insurance coverage is mis-measured in such a 
way as to bias estimates of take-up and crowd-out.  To the extent that parents of children 
enrolled in SCHIP report their coverage as private insurance, increases in SCHIP eligibility will 
be associated with spurious gains in private coverage, which will offset true crowd-out effects.  
One way to test for this type of bias is to compare the estimated effect of public insurance 
eligibility on two different types of private coverage: group coverage and non-group coverage.  
The logic of this test is that although new forms of public coverage may resemble or even by 
provided by private health plans, there should be less ambiguity as to whether or not the 
coverage is provided through the workplace.  Thus, to the extent that SCHIP did crowd out 
private coverage but this effect was obscured by parents reporting SCHIP coverage as private, 
we would expect to see a positive effect of eligibility on non-group private insurance and a 
negative effect on group coverage.      
                                                 
8 Our results are robust to the inclusion of state-time interaction effects, though we do not present these 
results. 
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This is exactly what we observe.  Table 5 presents results for non-group private coverage 
and group coverage.  For both the full sample (columns 1 and 2) and the target group subsample 
(columns 3 and 4), eligibility for public insurance has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on non-group private coverage.  Because there is no reason why being made eligible for 
public insurance should increase the probability a child has non-group private insurance, we 
interpret this result as reflecting an increase in (misreported) public coverage.  Indeed, because 
SCHIP is a less expensive substitute for private non-group coverage, the true impact of SCHIP 
on private non-group should be less than or equal to zero.  Our models imply that, 
conservatively, there was an additional 2 percentage point increase in public enrollment 
associated with the SCHIP expansions on top of that captured by the measured change in public 
coverage.  
When the dependent variable is group insurance, the coefficients on the public eligibility 
variables are all negative.  In the full sample, the estimated coefficient on PUBELIG is –.019, 
with a t-statistic = 1.35.  The coefficients on MELIG and SELIG have comparable magnitudes 
and p-values.  When we limit the sample to children in the target group, the coefficients are 
slightly larger and achieve conventional levels of significance.  These models imply that being 
made eligible for public insurance reduces the probability that a child is covered by group 
insurance by between 2 and 3 percentage points.     
  These measurement problems make it difficult to precisely calculate the take-up rate or 
the crowd-out effect.  Nonetheless, under certain assumptions we can construct several measures 
of take-up and crowd-out associated with the SCHIP expansions and the associated changes in 
the number of children with particular coverage types.  Table 6 displays these estimates.  The 
estimates in the first panel correspond to the regression results reported in Tables 3 and 4, and   20  
are based on the assumption that insurance coverage is measured accurately in the March CPS.  
Using our public eligibility variable, we estimate that 12.7 million children were made income-
eligible for public insurance because of the SCHIP expansions.  Thus, the 8.1% take-up rate 
estimated for the full sample implies that just over 1 million children gained public insurance 
coverage because of SCHIP.  When we use the results from the target group subsample, the 
lower take-up rate means that the estimated number of children gaining coverage is less than half 
as large.  These figures are low relative to the 20 to 24% marginal take-up rates for the Medicaid 
expansions estimated by Shore-Sheppard (1997) and Cutler and Gruber (1996), and closer to the 
range of estimates provided by Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2001).  However, our estimates are 
larger than the zero take-up found by Card and Shore-Sheppard (2002) for expansions targeted at 
a population that is similar to the SCHIP population.   
Of course, because SCHIP eligibility was also tied to prior insurance coverage, not all 
children meeting the program’s income eligibility standards were truly eligible.  Thus, these 
take-up rates are somewhat misleading as they overestimate the number of children foregoing 
public coverage for which they qualify.  While it is not feasible with the CPS data to incorporate 
the insurance-related eligibility standards in our regression models, we can calculate a rough 
estimate of take-up among children meeting all eligibility requirements.  This is done by 
removing from the denominator in the take-up calculation children meeting the SCHIP income 
eligibility standard who had private insurance in 1996.  This adjustment yields take-up rates that 
are closer to those of Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Shore-Sheppard (1997).  Dividing the 
increase in public enrollment of 1.03 million by the estimated 3.1 million uninsured children who 
gained SCHIP eligibility produces a hypothetical take-up rate of roughly 33%.  Using the lower 
estimated enrollment increase from the target group regressions yields a take-up rate of 14%.     21  
When we treat the insurance variables as accurate, the point estimates for the share of 
new public enrollment accounted for by children who previously had private insurance ranges 
from 0% to 20%, depending on the estimation sample and whether the ratio is calculated using 
the uninsured or privately insured regression results.  The largest of these estimates corresponds 
to a total of 76,000 children.   
In the second panel of Table 6 we adjust the take-up and crowd-out estimates for the 
possibility that the increase in non-group private insurance associated with the SCHIP eligibility 
expansions actually represents an increase in public coverage.  To calculate an adjusted take-up 
rate among the income eligible we sum the effect of public eligibility on public coverage with 
the estimated effect on non-group.  The latter effect is roughly 2 to 3 percentage points, yielding 
adjusted take-up rates of 5 to 10%, depending on the sample used.  The higher of these two 
estimates corresponds to a total of roughly 1.3 million children.  Our adjusted measure of crowd-
out is based on the estimated effect of public eligibility on employer-sponsored group coverage.  
When we incorporate the coefficients reported in Table 4, we obtain crowd-out estimates of 
between 18 and 50%.
9   This is similar to the range of the estimates found by Shore-Sheppard 
(1997) and the largest of our point estimates is similar to Cutler and Gruber’s (1996) estimate.   
In the full sample, the crowd-out estimates correspond to a range of 241,000 to 381,000 children 
who enrolled in public insurance who otherwise would have been enrolled in private insurance in 
the absence of the SCHIP expansions.  
 
                                                 
9 These measures assume that true non-group coverage was not affected by SCHIP.  If in fact some families 
substituted SCHIP coverage for non-group insurance, our adjusted take-up and crowd-out estimates will be 
understated. 
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Discussion 
This paper presents the first national estimates of the effects of the SCHIP expansions on 
insurance coverage.  Several key findings emerge from our analysis.  First, we find that SCHIP 
had a small, but statistically significant positive effect on insurance coverage.  Our regression 
results imply that between 4% and 10% of children meeting income eligibility standards for the 
new program enrolled in public insurance.  Take-up rates calculated for children who were both 
income-eligible and previously uninsured are considerably higher and are in line with estimated 
take-up rates for the Medicaid expansions of the 1980s and early 1990s.  These adjusted take-up 
rates are probably too large, as they implicitly assume that all the new SCHIP enrollment came 
from the ranks of the uninsured, which our crowd-out results suggest was not the case.  
Nonetheless, even our lower estimates based only on income eligibility rules indicate that states 
were more successful in enrolling children in SCHIP than they were with prior Medicaid 
expansions focused on children just above the poverty line.   
One possible explanation for SCHIP’s greater success relative to earlier Medicaid 
expansions is that newly established SCHIP expansion programs were viewed more favorably by 
low income families than Medicaid.  However, when we distinguish between states that 
implemented SCHIP by expanding Medicaid and those that started new programs, we find little 
support for this argument.  Our point estimates indicate that eligibility for stand-alone SCHIP 
programs has a slightly more negative effect on the probability of being uninsured, but the 
differences between the two types of programs are not statistically significant.  An alternative 
explanation is that as states enacted SCHIP they devoted considerable resources to outreach and 
marketing, and streamlined many enrollment procedures (US GAO, 2000).  It is not possible 
with our data to assess the impact of these efforts or to compare the strategies taken by different   23  
states.  A recent study by Aizer (2002) finds that outreach through community-based 
organizations and a television advertising campaign increased Medicaid take-up in California.  
More research in this area would be valuable.  
One factor limiting SCHIP enrollment is the various policies that were enacted to prevent 
crowd-out, such as waiting periods and premium contributions.  It is perhaps surprising that 
despite these policies, our results indicate that perhaps as much as half of the new SCHIP 
enrollment was offset by declining private coverage.  There are several, overlapping explanations 
for this apparently counterintuitive result.  First, it is important to understand that crowd-out, as 
measured in the repeated cross-section data we use, does not consist entirely of direct transitions 
from private to public coverage.  Crowd-out can also be said to occur if the availability of SCHIP 
reduces the number of transitions in the other direction (i.e., children going off Medicaid as their 
family income increases), or reduces transitions from being uninsured to having private 
coverage.  In addition, there is some evidence that state concerns regarding the initially low 
enrollment levels in SCHIP outweighed crowd-out concerns, in some cases resulting in states 
weakening their crowd-out controls (Lutzky and Hill 2001).  The tension between achieving high 
rates of take-up for public insurance programs and limiting the substitution of public for private 
coverage remains an important policy issue and comparisons of alternative strategies for 
balancing these objectives is an important topic for future research.    
Finally, our results point to a serious data problem facing researchers in this area.  State 
efforts to make public insurance programs more attractive to eligible families and increased 
contracting with private health plans has blurred the line between public and private health 
insurance.  The finding of a positive relationship between SCHIP eligibility and private non-
group coverage suggests that some CPS respondents whose children are insured through SCHIP   24  
report that coverage as private insurance.  This ambiguity in distinguishing private and public 
coverage makes it difficult to use these data to track changes in type of insurance and to 
accurately estimate rates of take-up and crowd-out. 
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Figure 1: Insurance Coverage for Children 
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Weighted data from March CPS, years 1997-2001. 
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Figure 2: Insurance Coverage for Children Under 19 Years Old
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Weighted data from March CPS, years 1997-2001.   30  
Figure 3: Insurance Coverage for Children Under 19 Years 
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Weighted data from March CPS, years 1997-2001 
   31  
Figure 4: Insurance Coverage for Children Under 19 Years 
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Table 1. Summary of SCHIP Expansions, by State for the Years 1996 and 2000 
      % FPL Eligibility Cutoff, 
1-5 year olds 
% FPL Eligibility Cutoff, 






1996 2000 1996 2000 
AK  M  3/99  133  200 71 200 
AL  C  2/98  133  200  15  200 
AR  M  10/98 133  200 18 200 
AZ  S  10/97  133  200  30  200 
CA  C  3/98  133  200 82 200 
CO  S  4/98  133  185  37  185 
CT  C  7/97  185  300 81 300 
DC  M  10/98  133  200  50  200 
DE  S  10/98  133 200 100 200 
FL  C  4/98  133  200  28  200 
GA  S  9/98  133 200 100 200 
HI  M  1/00  133  185  100  100 
IA  C  7/98  133  185 37 185 
ID  M  10/97  133  150  29  150 
IL  M  1/98  133  185 46 185 
IN  C  10/97  133  150  27  150 
KS  S  7/98  133 200 100 200 
KY  C  7/98  133  200  33  200 
LA  M  11/98 133  150 10 150 
MA  C  10/97  133  200  86  200 
MD  M  7/98  185  200 40 200 
ME  C  8/98  133  185  125  185 
MI  C  5/98  150 200 150 200 
MN  M  9/98  275  280  275  280 
MO  M  10/97  133 300 100 300 
MS  C  3/97  133  200  34  200 
MT  S  1/98  133  150 41 150 
NC  S  10/98  133  200  100  200 
ND  C  10/98 133  140 40 140 
NE  M  5/98  133  185  33  185 
NH  C  5/98  185 300 185 300 
NJ  C  2/98  133  350  41  350 
NM  M  3/99  185 235 185 235 
NV  S  10/98  133  200  31  200 
NY  C  4/98  133  192 51 192 
OH  M  1/98  133  150  33  150 
OK  M  12/97  133 185 100 185 
OR  S  7/98  133  170  100  170 
PA  S  6/98  133  200 41 200 
RI  M  10/97  250  250  51  250 
SC  M  8/97  133  150 48 150 
SD  M  7/98  133  140  100  140 
TN  M  10/97  400 400 100 400 
(continues)   33  
Table 1. Summary of SCHIP Expansions 1996 and 2000, by State (cont.) 
      % FPL Eligibility Cutoff, 
1-5 year olds 
% FPL Eligibility Cutoff, 






1996 2000 1996 2000 
TX  C  7/98  133  133 17 100 
UT  S  8/98  133  200  100  200 
VA  S  10/98  133 185 100 185 
VT  S  10/98  225  300  225  300 
WA  S  1/00  200 250 200 250 
WI  M  4/99  185  185  45  185 
WV  C  7/98  133 150 100 150 
WY  S  4/99  133  133  55  133 
a M = Medicaid expansion only, S = separate new insurance program, C = combination program 
Source: http://cms.hcfa.gov/   34  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables, Stratified by Type of Insurance 
Variable  All  Uninsured  Public Private 
Public eligible  0.380  0.571  0.803  0.213 
Medicaid eligible  0.318  0.488  0.733  0.156 
Eligible for stand-alone program   0.062  0.083  0.071  0.057 
Number of Persons in Household  4.210  4.131  4.245 4.218 
 (1.480)  (1.807)  (1.806)  (1.293) 
Household type         
 Two-parent  household  0.694  0.566  0.400  0.798 
  Male head of household  0.055  0.104  0.059  0.043 
  Fem head of household  0.251  0.330  0.541  0.159 
Gender of child         
 Male  0.512  0.514  0.509  0.513 
 Female  0.488  0.486  0.491  0.487 
Race        
 White  0.627  0.422  0.400  0.735 
 Hispanic  0.157  0.309  0.244  0.099 
 Black  0.160  0.201  0.293  0.115 
 Other  0.056  0.068  0.063  0.051 
Workers in Household         
  0 workers in household  0.122  0.179  0.358  0.039 
  1 worker in household  0.394  0.457  0.457  0.367 
  2+ workers in household  0.484  0.364  0.185  0.594 
At least 1 person works in large firm  0.661  0.460  0.447  0.764 
Number with Some College         
  0 persons with some college  0.404  0.618  0.680  0.286 
  1 person with some college  0.276  0.243  0.245  0.294 
  2+ persons with some college 0.320  0.139  0.075  0.420 
Total # in household in fair/poor health  0.174  0.206  0.372 0.115 
 (0.548)  (0.599)  (0.798)  (0.429) 
MSA residence  0.779  0.778  0.756  0.784 
Foreign born  0.215  0.397  0.218  0.175 
Year          
 1996  0.198  0.206  0.209  0.192 
 1997  0.199  0.212  0.199  0.196 
 1998  0.200  0.217  0.194  0.199 
 1999  0.201  0.197  0.197  0.204 
 2000  0.202  0.168  0.201  0.209 
Sample size  190,257  29,032  38,906 127,071 
Notes: Standard deviations of continuous variables in parentheses.  Computations from March CPS data from 1997 
to 2001.  Sample size is 190,257; sub-sample sizes add up to more than full sample size because some individuals 
report both public and private insurance coverage during the year.   35  
Table 3. The Effect of Eligibility for Public Insurance on Health Insurance Coverage, IV 
Results 
 (1)  (2) 
Uninsured    














2 0.084  0.086 
 
 Public Insurance 
  














2 0.294  0.295 
 
 Private Insurance 
  














2 0.330  0.329 
Notes: Results are based on regressions using March CPS data from 1997 to 2001.  Model (1) pools Medicaid and 
stand-alone eligibility and model (2) separates eligibility for Medicaid and stand-alone programs.  All regressions 
control for AFDC/TANF caseload, number of person in the household, race, number of parents present and their 
gender, number of workers in the household, whether any in household works for a large firm (>50 employees), 
education of parents, number of people in household in fair or poor health, MSA residence, foreign birth, age 
dummies for each age 1-18, time dummies, and state dummies.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The sample size is 
190,257.   
** indicates p<0.01, * indicates 0.05<p<0.01  36  
Table 4. The Effect of Eligibility for Public Insurance on Health Insurance Coverage for 
Families with Income Between 100-200% FPL, IV Results  
  (1) (2) 
 Uninsured    


















































2 0.138  0.139 
Notes: Results are based on 2SLS regressions using March CPS data from 1997 to 2001.  Model (1) pools Medicaid 
and stand-alone eligibility and model (2) separates eligibility for Medicaid and stand-alone programs.  All 
regressions control for AFDC/TANF caseload, number of person in the household, race, number of parents present 
and their gender, number of workers in the household, whether any in household works for a large firm (>50 
employees), education of parents, number of people in household in fair or poor health, MSA residence, foreign 
birth, age dummies for each age 1-18, time dummies, and state dummies.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The 
sample size is 42,991. 
** indicates p<0.01, * indicates 0.05<p<0.01 
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Table 5. The Effect of Eligibility for Public Insurance on Private Group Health Insurance 
Coverage and Private Non-Group Health Insurance Coverage, IV Results for Full Sample 
and 100-200% FPL Children 
  Full Sample  100-200% FPL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Private Non-Group Insurance        
















2 0.053  0.053  0.067  0.067 
 
Private Group Insurance 
     
















2  0.346 0.345  0.157 0.160 
Sample size  190,257  42,991 
Notes: Results are based on regressions using March CPS data from 1997 to 2001.  Models (1) and (3) pool 
Medicaid and stand-alone eligibility and models (2) and (4) separate eligibility for Medicaid and stand-alone 
programs.  All regressions control for AFDC/TANF caseload, number of person in the household, race, number of 
parents present and their gender, number of workers in the household, whether any in household works for a large 
firm (>50 employees), education of parents, number of people in household in fair or poor health, MSA residence, 
foreign birth, age dummies for each age 1-18, time dummies, and state dummies.  Standard errors in parentheses.   
** indicates p<0.01, * indicates 0.05<p<0.01 
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 Table 6. Estimates of Take-Up and Crowd-Out Associated with SCHIP Expansions Under 
Different Assumptions 
















Private Coverage Variable is Accurate      
  Take-up among income eligible  8.1%  1,029  3.5%  344 
  Take-up among income eligible uninsured
a  33.3% 1,029  14.4%  344 
 Crowd-Out
b:        
 Lower  point  estimate  0.0%  0  0.0%  0 
 Higher  point  estimate  7.4%  76  20.0%  69 
        
Increased Non-Group Coverage is result of 
SCHIP
c 
      
  Take-up among income eligible  10.5%  1,333  5.4%  530 
  Take-up among income eligible uninsured
a  43.1% 1,333  22.2%  530 
 Crowd-Out
b:          
 Lower  point  estimate  18.1%  241  35.2%  186 
 Higher  point  estimate  28.6%  381  50.0%  265 
a Hypothetical calculation assuming that the increase in public enrollment came from children who were uninsured.   
b Crowd out is computed two alternative ways: once as the ratio of the decrease in private coverage to the increase in 
public coverage, and again as the portion of the increase in public coverage not accounted for by the decrease in 
uninsurance.   
c Take-up calculations assume the increase in non-group coverage associated with SCHIP expansions represent 
public enrollment; group insurance coverage is used as the basis for crowd-out calculations. 
 